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Neutral Principles
and the Right to Neutral Access to the Courtst
JEFFmREY R. PANKRATZ*
"The democratic integrity of law ... depends entirely upon the degree
to which its processes are legitimate."'
"To no one will We sell, to none will We deny or delay, right or
justice.'"
INTRODUCTION
This Comment takes a conservative constitutional theory and argues for
what some would consider to be a very liberal proposition: a right of access
to the courts for all citizens regardless of ability to pay. At first blush, it
might seem absurd to suggest that a right to court access irrespective of
economic status is consistent with the original intent of the framers of the
Constitution. However, the idea that justice should not be rationed on the
basis of ability to pay is not a new one, as the quotation from the Magna
Carta, chapter 40, illustrates.'
Robert Bork's theory of original understanding has been attacked as
producing a rigid and mechanical jurisprudence. 4 Others have contended
that the theory is simply a pretense used by conservative judges to impose
their political agendas. 5 Examination of Bork's theory, however, reveals
that it does not necessarily favor either conservative or liberal thought. 6
Nor does it produce simply rigid legal doctrine, frozen in the late 1700s.
t © Copyright 1992 by Jeffrey R. Pankratz.
* J.D., 1991, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington; B.S., 1983, California
Polytechnic State University.
1. R. BoRK, THE TEMPTNG OF AMERICA 2 (1990).
2. Magna Carta, 1215, 16 John, ch. 40.
3. Another illustration of the long-standing recognition of the need for universal access
to the courts is a statute promulgated in 1495 by Henry VII providing "that the judge should
appoint counsel for the poor in civil suits." Weinstien, The Poor's Right to Equal Access to
the Courts, 13 CoNm. L. REv. 651, 658 (1981) (citation omitted).
4. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, The Constitution Is Not "Hard Law':" The Bork Rejection
and the Future of Constitutional Law, 6 CoNsT. Comm. 29 (1989). For a series of essays
criticizing Bork's jurisprudence, see The Bork Nomination, 9 CARnozo L. REv. 1 (1989).
5. Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469, 470 (1981).
-6. Bork himself rejects this criticism: "[t]he philosophy of original understanding means
that the ratifiers of the Constitution and today's legislators make the political decisions, and
the courts do their best to implement them. That is not a conservative philosophy or a liberal
philosophy; it is merely the design of the American Republic." R. BoRK, supra note 1, at
177.
1091
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
According to Bork, evolving legal doctrine does not unsettle the originalist. 7
In fact, it is both desirable and inevitable. The role of the originalist judge
is "to discern how the framers' values, defined in the context of the world
they knew, apply to the world we know." 8
In view of this context, derivation of a constitutional right of court access
might be possible. Furthermore, considering the evolution of the judicial
process, including an increasingly complex body of procedural law and an
overwhelming reliance on attorneys, an indigent's right to counsel and to
other legal services would be a logical application of such a right of access
in today's world.
Part I of this Comment outlines Robert Bork's theory of original under-
standing. Part II uses that theory to derive, from both the due process
clauses and the structure of the Constitution, a right to "neutral access"
to the courts for all citizens. Part III then demonstrates that the right to
neutral access requires that indigents be provided with legal services in civil
proceedings. 9
I. ROBERT BORK'S THEORY OF ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING
A. The Madisonian Dilemma
According to Bork, the primary function of the federal judiciary is to
resolve the "Madisonian dilemma."' 0 "The dilemma is that neither the
majority nor the minority can be trusted to define the proper spheres of
democratic authority and individual liberty. The first would court tyranny
by the majority; the second, tyranny by the minority."" The authority to
reconcile these principles of majority power and minority freedom has been
"[p]laced .. . in a nonpolitical institution, the federal judiciary, and thus,
ultimately, in the Supreme Court" of the United States.' 2
7. R. BOPK, supra note 1, at 168-69 (quoting Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 973 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., concurring)).
8. Id. at 168 (quoting Olman, 750 F.2d at 973 (Bork, J., concurring)).
9. The arguments in this Comment are applicable to both civil and criminal proceedings.
However, since the Supreme Court already recognizes an indigent's right to court-appointed
counsel in criminal proceedings, see, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), this
Comment will focus exclusively on the need for a right to counsel and other legal services in
civil proceedings.
10. R. BoRK, supra note 1, at 139.
11. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DINGO L. REv.
823, 824 (1986).
12. R. BoRK, supra note 1, at 139. While resolution of the Madisonian dilemma is the
central function of the courts, Bork recognizes other functions as well.
There is, of course, more to the Court's constitutional function than defining in
so direct a fashion the rights of the individual against the state. There is the
related task of maintaining the system of government the Constitution creates.
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Proper exercise of this authority requires that the Court's decisions rest
on "reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any
immediate result that is involved. 13 The legitimate exercise of the Court's
power is dependent upon its ability to
demonstrate in reasoned opinions that it has a valid theory, derived
from the Constitution, of the respective spheres of majority and minority
freedom. If it does not have such a theory but merely imposes its own
value choices, or worse if it pretends to have a theory but actually
follows its own predilections, the Court violates the postulates of the
Madisonian model that alone justifies its power.'4
Thus, the Court must act on principles outside its own value choices; that
is, it "must not be merely a 'naked power organ.""P 5
B. The Constitution as Law: Neutral Principles
Under Bork's theory the Constitution is to be interpreted as law in much
the same way a judge would interpret a statute, a contract, a will, or the
opinion of a court. This is not to say that a judge should not take into
account the differences in various legal materials. 6 But, these differences
aside, "the judge is to interpret what is in the text and not something
else."' 17
Bork's concept of neutral principles logically follows from the premise
that the Constitution is law. Bork borrows the term "neutral principles"
The Court must often discern the powers of Congress and those of the President
when the claims of each come into conflict, as, it appears, they increasingly do.
Similarly, though the Court has largely abandoned the role, there is the job of
defining the respective spheres of national and state authority. These questions
of governmental structure, competence, and authority are, of course, closely
related to the resolution of the Madisonian dilemma and may in fact amount to
much the same thing.
Id. at 140.
13. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 2
(1971) (footnote omitted) (quoting H. WECHSLER, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, in PUNcnLEs, Pouncs, AND FuNDAmENTAL LAW 3, 27 (1961)).
14. Id. at 3.
15. Id. at 2 (footnote omitted); see also H. WECHSLER, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, in PucnF.aS, Poumcs, AND FuNDAMENTAL LAw 3, 27 (1961) (discussion
of need for principled court decisions reached with reasons that are neutral and general).
16. As Bork writes:
To be sure, there are differences in the way we deal with different legal materials,
which was the point of John Marshall's observation in McCulloch v. Maryland
that "we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding." By
that he meant that narrow, legalistic reasoning was not to be applied to the
document's broad j rovisions, a document that could not, by its nature and uses,
"partake of the prolixity of a legal code."
R. Borne, supra note 1, at 145 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
17. Id.
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from Professor Herbert Wechsler.' s Wechsler spoke of the neutral applica-
tion of principle. Bork builds on this concept, calling also for the neutral
derivation and definition of principles. Under Bork's theory a judge must
neutrally derive, define, and'apply legal principles. 9 The neutral derivation
and definition of legal principles requires that constitutional principles be
based on the public's understanding of the text and design of the Consti-
tution at the time it was enacted. The neutral application of principles
requires that the judge be willing to apply a given principle in the same
way to two cases that he cannot honestly distinguish.
1. The Neutral Derivation and Definition of Principles
According to Bork there are two methods for deriving principles from
the Constitution. "The first is to take from the document rather specific
values that text or history show the framers actually to have intended and
which are capable of being translated into principled rules."' 20 Bork calls
these "specified rights" since they are derived directly from the text and
history of the Constitution. 21 "The second method derives rights from
governmental processes established by the Constitution."2 These "secondary
rights" are derived from the guarantee clauseP since they exist to guarantee
citizens a republican form of government. To derive secondary rights the
judge should examine the provisions and structure of the Constitution along
with the political history of the United States.24 The principles are "derived
from the requirements of our form of government."' '
18. H. WECHSLER, supra note 15, at 27, quoted in Bork, supra note 16, at 2.
19. Bork, supra note 16, at 23. See generally R. BORIK, supra note I (The domination of
politics in the law diminishes the democratic integrity of the law.).
20. Bork, supra note 13, at 17.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government .... ." U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4; see Bork, supra note 16, at 19 (discussing
derivation).
24. Bork, supra note 13, at 19.
Whether one chooses to use the guarantee of a republican form of government
of article IV, § 4 as a peg or to proceed directly to considerations of constitutional
structure and political practice probably makes little difference. Madison's writing
on the republican form of government specified by the guarantee clause suggests
that representative democracy may properly take many forms, so long as the
forms do not become "aristocratic or monarchical."
Id.; see also Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979
WAsH. U.L.Q. 695 ("[Ilnterpretation according the Constitution's structure and function....
is the judicial method of McCulloch v. Maryland .... "(footnote omitted)). For an analysis
of this approach, see C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONsTrTUTIONAL. LAW (1969).
25. Bork, supra note 13, at 19.
1094 [Vol. 67:1091
NEUTRAL ACCESS
Once a principle has been derived from the Constitution, it must be
neutrally defined. 26 The breadth or level of generality of the principle must
be consistent with the intent of the ratifiers. A judge should state the
principle at the level of generality "that interpretation of the words, struc-
ture, and history of the Constitution fairly supporto . 27 The proper defi-
nition of a specified right requires an accurate analysis of the text and
constitutional history.n In contrast, the proper definition of a secondary
right requires an analysis of whether the right is needed to preserve the
"Madisonian" governmental process. 29
2. The Neutral Application of Principles
Once a principle has been properly derived and defined it must be neutrally
applied. This requires that the judge 'sincerely believe in the principle
upon which he purports to rest his decision.' 'The judge' . . . 'must believe
in the validity of the reasons given for the decision at least in the sense
that he is prepared to apply them to a later case which he cannot honestly
distinguish." ' '30 The judge must apply the principle "consistently and without
regard to his sympathy or lack of sympathy with the parties before him."'"
This neutral application of principle does not, however, mean "that the
judge will never change the principle he has derived and defined. '32
26. R. BoRK, supra note 1, at 147 (footnote omitted):
The Constitution states its principles in majestic generalities that we know cannot
be taken as sweepingly as the words alone might suggest. The first amendment
states that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech,"
but no one has ever supposed that Congress could not make some speech unlawful
or that it could not make all speech illegal in certain places, at certain times,
and under certain circumstances.
27. Id. at 150.
28. For an illustration of defining a specified right under the equal protection clause, see
id. at 149-50.
29. Secondary rights are derived and defined based on their utility in preserving the
Madisonian system:
Secondary or derivative rights are not possessed by the individual because the
Constitution has made a value choice about individuals. Neither are they possessed
because the Supreme Court thinks them fundamental to all humans. Rather,
these rights are located in the individual for the sake of a governmental process
that the Constitution outlines and that the Court should preserve. They are given
to the individual because his enjoyment of them will lead him to defend them in
court and thereby preserve the governmental process from legislative or executive
deformation.
Bork, supra note 13, at 17.
30. Id. at 2 (quoting Professor Louis L. Jaffe in L. JAFFE, ENGLISH AND AMElucAN JUDGaS
AS LAWMAKERS 38 (1969)).
31. R. Boas, supra note 1, at 151.
32. Id.
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Anybody who has dealt extensively with law knows that a new case may
seem to fall within a principle as ,stated and yet not fall within the
rationale underlying it. As new cases present new patterns, the principle
will often be restated and redefined. There is nothing wrong with that;
it is, in fact, highly desirable. But the judge must be clarifying his own
reasoning and verbal formulations and not trimming to arrive at results
desired on grounds extraneous to the Constitution.
33
In Oilman v. Evans,34 Bork described what he believes is the proper
evolution of legal doctrine. Oilman expanded libel protection to the media
on the basis of the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press.
Bork reasoned that "it is the task of the judge in this generation to discern
how the framers' values, defined in the context of the world they knew,
apply to the world we know."135 While judges "know very little of the
precise intentions of the framers and ratifiers of the speech and press
clause," 6 they do know that the judiciary was given the responsibility to
protect "the value of preserving free expression." 3 7 Thus, judges may
properly "refine and evolve doctrine ... so long as one is faithful to the
basic meaning" of the constitutional text. 8
[Judges] must never hesitate to apply old values to new circumstances,
whether those circumstances are changes in technology or changes in
the impact of traditional common law actions .... The important
thing, the ultimate consideration, is the constitutional freedom that is
given into [the judge's] keeping. A judge who refuses to see new threats
to an established constitutional value, and hence provides a crabbed
interpretation that robs a provision of its full, fair and reasonable
meaning, fails in his judicial duty. That duty, I repeat, is to ensure that
the powers and freedoms the framers specified are made effective in
today's circumstances. The evolution of doctrine to accomplish that end
contravenes no postulate of judicial restraint."
The judge's task, as understood by Bork, is to "discern how the framers'
values, defined in the context of the world they knew, apply to the world
we know."40
33. Id.
34. 750 F.2d 970, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 995.
36. Id. at 996.
37. Id.
38. Id.
Why is it different to refine and evolve doctrine here, so long as one is faithful
to the basic meaning of the amendment, than it is to adapt the fourth amendment
to take account of electronic surveillance, the commerce clause to adjust to
interstate motor carriage, or the first amendment to encompass the electronic
media? I do not believe there is a difference. To say that such matters must be
left to the legislature is to say that changes in circumstances must be permitted
to render constitutional guarantees meaningless.
Id.
39. Id.; see also R. BoRK, supra note 1, at 169 (discussion of application of old values to
new circumstances to ensure that the freedoms established by the framers are protected today).
40. Olman, 750 F.2d at 995.
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Using Bork's interpretative method, a constitutional right of access to the
courts for citizens of all economic classes and a corresponding indigent's
right to legal services is possible. To establish such a right, first it must be
shown that access to the courts is a principle embodied in either the text
or structure of the Constitution. Second, it must be shown that the principle
of court access, applied "to the world we know," requires the recognition
of an indigent's right to legal services.
II. THE RIGHT TO NEUTRAL ACCESS TO THE COURTS
All citizens have a right to "neutral access" to the courts-that is, access
sufficient to provide citizens a reasonable opportunity to have the law
neutrally applied to them in fact.4 ' Neutral access is, by necessity, a flexible
standard because it depends upon the design of the judicial system, which
changes over time. At a minimum, however, neutral access in an adversarial
system requires that both parties be able to use the procedural and sub-
stantive rules necessary to present evidence and to argue the law relevant
to the case. It may not require absolute equal access (that is, equal ability
by both parties to manipulate procedural rules, to marshal all relevant facts,
and to argue all relevant law), since the judge can balance a certain degree
of inequality, but it does at least require that both sides be minimally
competent to use the legal system.
The right to neutral access is a logical corollary of Bork's theory of
neutral application of laws. More important, a right to neutral access can
be derived from two independent constitutional sources-the due process
clauses and the structure of the Constitution.
A. The Right to Neutral Access as a Corollary
to the Neutral Application Requirement
As was explained in Part I, according to Bork, the neutral application
of the law means that judges must apply the same principle in the same
way to two different cases that cannot honestly be distinguished. If, as
Bork contends, the Constitution requires that judges apply the law neutrally,
it must be because one of the goals of the Constitution is to guarantee that
individuals be treated neutrally in terms of the application of the laws.4 2
41. The actual neutral application of law to an individual requires the marshalling of
accurate facts and relevant law. In contrast, the merely theoretical neutral application of the
law requires only a neutral judge.
42. While Bork's theory focuses on the proper exercise of judicial power, such power is
not applied in a vacuum; it is applied to persons. It would make little sense if the Constitution
required the neutral application of principles to resolve the Madisonian dilemma at some
theoretical plane but then had no regard for whether the proper spheres of democratic authority
and individual liberty were maintained in actuality. See supra notes 10-15.
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Simply requiring that a judge apply the law neutrally guarantees only the
theoretical neutral application of the law. The actual neutral application of
the law requires two elements: a neutral judge and the presentation of
relevant legal principles and evidence. In an adversarial system, relevant
legal principles and evidence can be presented only when the law and
procedural tools are readily available and usable by both parties. Since the
Constitution was designed to protect rights in actuality and not simply in
theory, it must require that all citizens have access to the necessary law and
procedural tools needed to present a case before a court. In short, citizens
must have neutral access to the courts.
The need for a right to neutral access can be illustrated by way of an
example, based on circumstances set out in Reginald Smith's classic, Justice
and the Poor:
Joan and Jane each borrowed ten dollars from John in 1914, and for
two years paid interest at 180 percent. In 1916 a law was enacted fixing
36 percent as the maximum rate. The lender, John, by a device contrary
to statute, compelled both Joan and Jane to continue paying 156 percent
interest. The law provided that if excess interest were charged, the loan
would be declared void by a suit in equity.3
Bork's neutral application rule requires that if Joan and Jane each bring a
suit against John the judge must apply the law neutrally and declare each
loan void.44 However, if the procedural tools needed to bring suit are
affordable and usable by Joan but are so complicated and expensive that
Jane cannot use them, Joan and Jane will not be treated neutrally. Joan
can seek protection from the law while Jane, due to her inability to use the
courts, is left exposed to John's illegal actions. Thus, procedural tools
needed to bring suit must be made available to Jane. The constitutional
goal of the actual neutral application of the law can then be seen as
requiring two necessary elements: a neutral judge and neutral access to the
courts.
It might be argued at this point that drawing a right to neutral access
(access that will provide judges a reasonable opportunity to apply the law
neutrally in fact) from Bork's neutral application requirement assumes too
much about the intent of the framers and reads too much into Bork's
theory. The right to neutral access, however, not only logically flows from
Bork's neutral application requirement, it can also be demonstrated using
his requirement of neutral derivation and definition of principles. The right
43. R.H. SMrm, JUsTICE AND THE POOR 11 (1971).
44. While Bork's writings deal primarily with the interpretation and application of consti-
tutional mandates at the appellate level, his theory has implications for statutes such as this
since the issue of whether a court is legitimately exercising its constitutional authority "arises
when any court either exercises or declines to exercise the power to invalidate any act of
another branch of government." Bork, supra note 13, at 2.
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to neutral access can be derived and defined from both the due process
clauses and the structure of the Constitution.
B. The Right to Neutral Access Derived
from the Due Process Clause
According to Bork the meaning of the words "due process" in the fifth
amendment was incorporated into the fourteenth amendment due process
clause.4 This appears to be the general understanding of the clauses by
both conservative and liberal theorists alike. As Professor Rubin has ex-
plained, "The extent to which the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause was intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights may be disputed, but
it was at least intended to incorporate the due process clause of the fifth
amendment."' ' Thus, the meaning of both due process clauses can be
determined by examining the intent of the framers concerning the first
clause in 1791.
The term "due process of law" finds its roots in Magna Carta chapter
3947" and chapter 40,48 which together became chapter 29 of the Third Reissue
in 1225.49 Chapter 29 read:
No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or deprived of his freehold
or his liberties or free customs, or outlawed or exiled, or in any manner
destroyed, nor shall we come upon him or send against him, except by
a legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. To no one will
we sell, to no one will we deny or delay right or justice. 0
As the Supreme Court explained in Murray v. Hoboken Land and Improve-
ment Co.:S'
The words, "due process of law," were undoubtedly intended to convey
the same meaning as the words, "by the law of the land," in Magna
Charta. Lord Coke, in his commentary on those words, (2 Inst. 50,)
45. R. Box, supra note 1, at 83 ("The framers of the fourteenth amendment adopted the
due process clause of the fifth amendment ....").
46. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALn. L. REv. 1044, 1048 (1984).
47. "No free man shall be taken, imprisoned, disseised, outlawed, or banished, or in any
way destroyed, nor will We proceed against or prosecute him, except by the lawful judgment
of his peers and by the law of the land." Magna Carta, 1215, 16 John, ch. 39.
48. "To no one will We sell, to none will We deny or delay, right or justice." Magna
Carta, 1215, 16 John, ch. 40.
49. Chapter 29 became the standard text thereafter. See CONGRESSIONAL REsEARcH SERV.,
THE CONSTrUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S.
Doc. no. 16, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 1281 (1982).
50. Chapter 29, Magna Carta, Third Reissue (1225). The phrase "due process of law"
initially appeared as a statutory rendition of chapter 29 in 1354 stating "no man of what
Estate or Condition he be, shall be put out of Land or Tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned,
nor disinherited, nor put to Death, without being brought in Answer by due Process of the
Law." Magna Carta, 1354, 28 Edw. 3, ch. 3.
51. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
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says they mean due process of law. The constitutions which had been
adopted by the several States before the formation of the federal
constitution, following the language of the great charter more closely,
generally contained the words, "but by the judgment of his peers, or
the law of the land." The ordinance of congress of July 13, 1787, for
the government of the territory of the United States northwest of the
river Ohio, used the same words.
52
In the Magna Carta, the expression "law of the land" bound the Crown
not to take rights from individuals without fair legal procedures, including
notice, a hearing, and judgment. 53 In the United States, the due process
clauses limit the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of government.5 4
In Bork's view, the due process clause "was designed only to require fair
procedures in implementing laws."5 5 "The framers of the fourteenth amend-
ment adopted the due process clause of the fifth amendment but thought
it necessary to add the equal protection clause, obviously understanding
that due process, the requirement of fair procedures, did not include the
requirement of equal protection in the substance of state laws. ' 5 6 Thus,
according to the original understanding, the core value that the due process
clauses were designed to protect was fair procedure.
How then was this core value of fair procedure defined by the founders
of the Constitution and, particularly concerning court access, what consti-
tuted a "fair" hearing? Answering this question requires an examination
of the development of the English and early American judicial systems. In
England, the concept of a fair hearing reflected a concern that the benefits
52. Id. at 276.
53. Howe, The Meaning of "Due Process of Law" Prior to the Adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 18 CAtni. L. REv. 483, 586 (1930); see also Bums, Due Process of Law: After
1890 Anything; Today Everything-A Bicentennial Proposal to Restore Its Original Meaning,
35 DE PAUL L. REv. 773, 780 (1986) (discussing the interpretation of this notion of due
process expressed in the Magna Carta by the seventeenth century English jurist Sir Edward
Coke).
54. The due process clause in the Bill of Rights does not require simply that the process
be in conformity with statutes enacted by legislative bodies. As the Court in Murray explained:
That the warrant now in question is legal process, is not denied. It was issued
in conformity with an act of Congress. But is it "due process of law"? The
constitution contains no description of those processes which it was intended to
allow or forbid. It does not even declare what principles are to be applied to
ascertain whether it be due process. It is manifest that it was not left to legislative
power to enact any process which might be devised. The article is a restraint on
the legislative as well as on the executive and judicial powers of the government,
and cannot be so construed as to leave congress [sic] free to make any process
"due process of law," by its mere will.
59 U.S. (18 How.) at 276.
55. R. BoRic, supra note 1, at 43. Wechsler takes a similar position. "Even 'due process,'
on the other hand, might have been confined, as Mr. Justice Brandeis urged originally, to a
guarantee of fair procedure ... the analogue for us of what the barons meant in Magna
Carta." H. WECHSLER, supra note 15, at 26 (footnote omitted).
56. R. BoRsc, supra note 1, at 83 (emphasis added).
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of the judicial system be available to all citizens, regardless of wealth.
Hence, the words in chapter 29 of the Third Reissue state: "[lo no one
will we sell, to no one will we deny or delay right or justice. 5s7 The legal
needs of those unable to afford counsel were met through special tribunals
and by providing legal assistance to indigents appearing in regular courts . 8
The suit in forma pauperis permitted actions in the regular courts without
payment of prohibitive court costs. Over time, in view of the widespread
use of counsel, this writ came to include the provision of counsel for
indigent litigants. In 1495 the practice was codified in a statute providing
for assigned attorneys to prepare and handle cases for indigent parties:
[E]very poor person or persons which have or hereafter shall have causes
of action against any person within this realm shall have by the discretion
of the Chancellor of this realm, for the time being, writs or writs
original, and subpoenas according to the nature of their causes, therefor
nothing paying to your Highness for the seals of the same, nor to any
person for the writing of the said writs to be hereafter sued; and that
the said Chancellor shall assign clerks to write the same writs ready to
be sealed; and also learned counsel and attorneys . . for such poor
person or persons and all other officers requisite and necessary to be
had for the speed of the said suits, which shall do their duties without
any reward for their counsels, and the same law shall be observed of
his Common Pleas, and barons of his Exchequer, and all other justices
in the courts of record where any such suit shall be.5 9
Despite these efforts to see that the judicial system was available to all
persons of the realm, the English system was far from perfect. Until 1836,
England engaged in the enigmatic practice of allowing accused criminals to
retain counsel in less serious crimes while denying representation to alleged
felons, whatever their economic status. 6° In addition, the English legal
machinery was slow, cumbersome, and complicated. The in forma pauperis
legislation contained no administrative guidance. 61 As a result, in practice
57. Magna Carta, Chapter 29, Third Reissue (1225).
58. Special tribunals designed to meet the needs of poor persons included the General Eyre,
the Chancery, the Star Chamber, the Court of Requests, and later on, the county courts. For
a description of these admirable yet imperfect attempts to meet the legal needs of the poor in
England, see Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARv. L. REv. 361 (1923).
59. 2 Hen. 7, ch. 12 (1495), reprinted in I. CALUSON, CouRts oF INJusTicE 595 (1956).
60. See W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO CoutsEs IN AmucAN CouRTs 8-9 (1955); see also
Note, The Right To Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 CoLTJM. L. Rav. 1322 (1966). "The
supposedly neutral position of the judge and his ability to protect the defendant served as the
dubious excuses for denying counsel in felony trials." To ensure the abolition of the this
practice] the sixth amendment was enacted" Id. at 1327 (footnotes omitted). Given this
incongruous practice in England, it is no wonder that the framers pushed for the specific
inclusion of such a right in the Bill of Rights. Contrary to current Supreme Court doctrine,
however, the sixth amendment was not originally intended to guarantee indigents a right to
state-appointed counsel. Instead, as Professor Wechsler points out, it provided simply "a right
to defend by counsel if you [had] one, contrary to what was then the English law." H.
WECHSLER, supra note 15, at 18 (footnote omitted).
61. Maguire, supra note 58, at 378.
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the act became susceptible to abuse. Judge-made rules designed to avoid
these abuses stripped the legislation of much of its designed positive impact.62
Despite its failings in practice, however, the enactment of the in forma
pauperis statute demonstrates the English conviction that fair procedure
required that all citizens, regardless of economic status, should have the
ability to use the procedural and substantive rules necessary to present
relevant evidence and legal doctrine to a court.
In the United States, the conviction that the judicial system should be
usable by all citizens was stronger. Statutes existed in many of the colonies
mandating equal treatment for all, regardless of wealth. 63 Nearly every state
constitution contained sections providing generally that every person ought
to have a certain remedy at law for all injuries to person, property, or
character and that justice be available without delay.6 For example, Article
IX, Section II of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, enacted in 1790, stated,
"All courts shall be open and every man for an injury done him in his
lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law; and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay. '65
At the same time, members of the new nation held strong convictions
that retention of a lawyer was not required to obtain a fair hearing. In
England, the need for lawyers had arisen primarily because of the devel-
opment of rigid and technical rules. In the American colonies the situation
was vastly different. 66 The early American trial often resembled deliberation
of the community on justice or injustice, and equitable principles rather
than legal precedent were the basis for decision. 67 Notably, most early
presiding judges were laypeople rather than lawyers. 68 Public resistance to
62. Id. at 376-78.
63. See Reinsch, The English Common Law in the Early American Colonies, in I SELEcT
ESSAYS ON ANGLO-AmERICAN LEOAL HISTORY 367, 404-05 (1907).
64. F. STESsON, THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF TIE UNITED
STATES 148-49 (1908) (citing the state constitutions). The clauses of the various state consti-
tutions used terms such as "without sale, denial or delay;" "prejudice;" "due course of law;"
"promptly and without delay;" "by due course of law, without sale, denial or delay;" "due
process of law;" "by the law of the land;" or "the judgment of his peers." Id. at 149, 169-
70 (footnotes omitted). The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights XI (1780) stated:
[e]very subject of the Commonwealth ought to find a certain remedy, by having
recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his
person, property, or character. He ought to obtain right and justice freely, and
without being obliged to purchase it;-completely, and without any denial;-
promptly, and without delay;-conformably to the laws.
Id. at 80.
65. See I. CALLIsoN, supra note 59, at 591.
66. See Note, supra note 60, at 1328. Both substantive and procedural law were charac-
terized by the "greatest laxity and informality." Reinsch, supra note 63, at 411.
67. Note, supra note 60, at 1328.
68. This situation occurred because
the technical knowledge of the lawyer was not in demand .... [T]he lawyers
had to turn their hands to semi-professional or non-professional work, the courts
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the notion that access to lawyers was essential for a fair hearing continued
well into the late eighteenth century. This conviction was based in large
part on a general hostility toward the legal profession. For example,
Benjamin Austin, a highly influential Anti-Federalist, wrote in 1786,
Why this intervening order? The law and evidence are all the essentials
required, and are not the judges with the jury competent for these
purposes? ...
... There is a danger of lawyers becoming formidable as a combined
body. The people should be guarded against it as it might subvert every
principle of law and establish a perfect aristocracy.6 9
Thus, rather than replicate the clumsy in forma pauperis statute to ensure
that all citizens could retain counsel, many persons pushed for legal systems
that could be understood and thus used by all without the retention of
counsel.70 With legal rules understandable to the layperson, thereby elimi-
nating the major expense of litigation, it was hoped that all citizens would
have effective access to the courts.7 '
This review of the American judicial system during the time leading up
to and surrounding the enactment of the fifth amendment due process clause
demonstrates the common public conviction that the value of fair procedure
(while not requiring retained counsel) included the concept that all citizens,
of the colonies at that date having no need of the aid of trained profession to
discover what was the law, as by the custom of the time the law was in so many
cases determined by the discretion of the court.
Reinsch, supra note 63, at 412; see also infra note 71 (discussion of costs incident to litigation).
69. C. WAsmPN, HisTopy OF THE HARvAIRD LAW SCHOOL AND OF EARLY LEGAL CONDITIONS
IN AmERiCA 191 (1970); see also F. AumANN, THE CHA cnIo AsmuANc LEGAL SysTEM; SoME
SELECTED PHASES 19 (1940) (discussing the restrictive legislation regarding lawyers in this
period).
70. In several jurisdictions, lay judges presided in the courts long beyond the revolutionary
period. F. Aum~AN, supra note 69, at 38. In New Hampshire, farmers, merchants, and
ministers served as state supreme court justices in the post-Revolutionary period. In Rhode
Island, a blacksmith was judge of the highest court from 1814 to 1818, and from 1818 to
1826 the chief justice was a farmer. Id. In 1803-1806, a series of statutes was passed in
Pennsylvania creating an elaborate machinery by which a party having a claim or debt might
file a statement in court, the other party might file an answer in informal shape, and thereupon
the case would proceed to judgment without the intervention of counsel.
Three states-Massachusetts, South Carolina, and Virginia-did have in forma pauperis
statutes prior to the enactment of the Bill of Rights. A handful of other states enacted statutes
later on: Kentucky (1798), New Jersey (1799), New York (1801), and the Louisiana Territory
(1807). Silverstein, Waiver of Court Costs and Appointment of Counsel for Poor Persons in
Civil Cases, VALP. L. REv. 21, 29; see also Maguire, supra note 58, at 381 (discussing the
Massachusetts in forma pauperis statute).
71. Costs incident to litigation other than for counsel were low. Maguire, supra note 58,
at 382. In the rare instances where a litigant could not afford even these costs, the courts had
their inherent power to waive these fees. See R.H. SMiTH, supra note 43, at 100-02. In addition,
almost universally courts were given discretion as to the award of costs in equity. See Maguire,
supra note 58, at 382 n.105 (noting, however, that such discretion may not have extended to
the remission of fees).
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regardless of economic status, must have the ability to present the necessary
evidence and the legal doctrine to the court. In other words, the value of
fair procedure embodied in the due process clause gave citizens a right to
neutral access to the courts, access that would give a judge reasonable
opportunity to apply the law neutrally in fact.
C. The Right to Neutral Access Derived
from Constititionally Established Government Procedures
The right to neutral access can be independently established through the
derivation of what Robert Bork calls "secondary" rights.72 In deriving a
"secondary" right to neutral access to the courts, the determinative question
is whether that right is needed to preserve the governmental process estab-
lished by the Constitution.73
The American republican system was justified primarily by the argument
that the legislature and executive could not be entrusted with the enforcement
of rights. 74 Hamilton's argument in The Federalist is that use of the courts
is essential to protect individual rights. 7 He wrote of "[tihat inflexible and
uniform adherence to the rights ... of individuals, which we perceive to
be indispensable in the courts of justice," arguing for the courts' role in
"the inviolable maintenance of that equality of privileges and immunities
to which the citizens of the Union will be entitled." 76
Since only the judiciary can be relied on to protect rights, all individuals
must have access to the courts. The risk of deforming the governmental
process by denying court access on the basis of economic status was
recognized by Reginald Heber Smith, the founder of the legal aid movement
in the United States:
For the State to erect an uneven, partial administration of justice is to
abnegate the very responsibility for which it exists, and is to accomplish
by indirection an abridgment of the fundamental rights which the State
is directly forbidden to infringe. To deny law or justice to any person
is, in actual effect, to outlaw them by stripping them of their only
protection.
Differences in the ability of classes to use the machinery of the law, if
permitted to remain, lead inevitably to disparity between the rights of
72. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
73. Supra note 22-25 and accompanying text.
74. D. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JusTIcE 254 (1988).
75. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton):
The independence of judges is ... requisite to guard ... the rights of individuals
from the effects of those ill humors which the arts of designing men, or the
influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people
themselves ... [including] the injury of the private rights of particular classes
of citizens, by unjust and partial laws.
76. THm FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton).
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classes in the law itself. And when the law recognizes and enforces a
distinction between classes, revolution ensues or democracy is at an
end."
It was this very rationale that the Supreme Court used to decide Boddie
v. Connecticut.78 In Boddie the Court struck down filing fees for divorce
courts on the ground that such fees excluded poor people from the courts
and thus violated their due process fights under the fourteenth amendment.
While the Court grounded its decision in the due process clause, its reasoning
was more consistent with Bork's theory of the derivation of "secondary"
rights. 79 The Court reasoned that the filing fee stripped poor citizens of
access to the legal system, deforming the system of government established
by the Constitution:
Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is more
fundamental than its erection and enforcement of a system of rules
defining the various rights and duties of its members, enabling them to
govern their affairs and definitively settle their differences in an orderly,
predictable manner. Without such a "legal system," social organization
and cohesion are virtually impossible .... Put more succinctly, it is
this injection of the rule of law that allows society to reap the benefits
of rejecting what political theorists call the "state of nature."''
Justice Harlan argued for the majority that since America "bottoms its
systematic definition of individual fights and duties" on the courts, "without
due process of law, the State's monopoly over techniques for binding conflict
resolution could hardly be ... acceptable under [the United States' consti-
tutional] scheme." 8'
The Court explicitly refrained, however, from finding a fight of universal
access to the courts.8 2 Instead, the Court drew two distinctions between
77. R. H. SMrr, supra note 43, at 5, 12.
78. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
79. Professor Ralph Winter has suggested that the Boddie decision could be justified under
Bork's theory of secondary rights. See Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and The Equal
Protection Clause, 1972 Sup. CT. Rav. 41, 60-61.
80. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374.
81. Id. at 375.
82. Harlan wrote:
We do not decide that access for all individuals to the courts is a right that is,
in all circumstances, guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment so that its exercise may. not be placed beyond the reach of any
individual, for, as we have already noted, in the case before us this right is the
exclusive precondition to the adjustment of a fundamental human relationship.
Id. at 382-83. While legal aid supporters have long argued that an individual has a constitutional
right to legal services in civil cases, the courts have consistently rejected that right except under
special circumstances. See Breger, Legal Aid For the Poor: A Conceptual Analysis, 60 N.C.L.
Rav. 282, 290 (1982). Boddie has been construed narrowly. See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S.
456 (1973); United States v. Kraus, 409 U.S. 434 (1973). Other lines of reasoning have also
been unpersuasive to the Court. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham,
452 U.S. 18 (1981); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (due process rationale); Ross
v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956) (equal protection rationale).
1992] 1105
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
divorce and other disputes in an effort to limit the opinion. The Court said
that open access to the courts was only required where the dispute involves
the "adjustment of a fundamental human relationship" and the courts are
the "exclusive" means of resolving the dispute.83
While the "theoretical framework" from which the Court reasons in
Boddie is fully consistent with the theory of original understanding, the rule
established from that framework is not. The rule applies only where access
to the court "is the exclusive precondition to the adjustment of a funda-
mental human relationship." 8' This limitation cannot be reconciled with
Bork's theory of original understanding. The only principled rule based
upon the framework set up by the Court was to recognize a universal right
to court access for all citizens.
Indeed, this was how Justice Black understood Boddie. In the same term
that Boddie was written, the Court considered certiorari in eight cases in
which indigents were denied court access due to their poverty. 5 In an
unusual dissent to the denial of certiorari in one of these cases, Justice
Black16 argued that under Boddie no citizen could be denied access to civil
courts because of an inability to pay legal fees or hire counsel:
In my view, the decision in Boddie v. Connecticut can safely rest on
only one crucial foundation-that the civil courts of the United States
and each of the States belong to the people of this country and that no
person can be denied access to those courts, either for a trial or an
appeal, because he cannot pay a fee, finance a bond, risk a penalty, or
afford to hire an attorney.87
He then went on to criticize the limitations set out in Boddie.
First, Justice Black showed that the "exclusiveness" of the judicial process
as a remedy is no limitation at all since "[t]he States and Federal Govern-
ment hold the ultimate power of enforcement in almost every dispute.""8
In American society private forms of dispute resolution do exist, but to be
effective these techniques must be backed by recourse to legal authority.8 9
83. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 383.
84. Id. at 382-83.
85. The Court denied certiorari in five of the cases: In re Garland, 402 U.S. 966 (1970);
Bourbeau v. Lancaster, 402 U.S. 964 (1970); Kaufman v. Carter, 402 U.S. 964 (1970); Meltzer
v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954 (1970); Beverly v. Scotland Urban Enter., Inc., 402
U.S. 936 (1970). Two were vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Boddie:
Sloatman v. Gibbons, 402 U.S. 939 (1970); Frederick v. Schwartz, 402 U.S. 937 (1970). In
only one case did the Court note probable jurisdiction: Lindsey v. Normet, 402 U.S. 941
(1970). The issue was subsequently resolved by Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1971).
86. Justice Black dissented in Boddie, 401 U.S. at 389.
87. Meltzer, 402 U.S. at 955 (Black, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 956.
89. Black reasoned:
Every law student learns in the first semester of law school that property, for
instance, is "valuable" only because the State will enforce the collection of rights
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Only through the potential recourse of state-approved adjudication can
citizens ensure themselves of the protection of the law.9° Because individuals
living in a democratic society must exchange recourse to self-help for legal
protection,9 they must be provided the opportunity to use the courts
effectively to resolve disputes.92
The other limitation on Boddie-that the dispute concerns a "fundamental
right"-conflicts with the Court's reasoning that the law protects interests
that are fundamental to the citizenry, not merely those that are fundamental
in the Constitution. 9 Thus, as Justice Black pointed out, no fair distinction
can be drawn between the right to divorce and other rights.94 Moreover,
this "fundamental rights" doctrine used in Boddie and other Supreme Court
opinions is, according to Bork, "unconnected with either the Constitution
or its history. ' ' 9F Thus, under the theory of original understanding the
limitation of "fundamental rights" is no limitation at all.
As Boddie demonstrates, a right to neutral access can be derived from
the governmental processes established by the Constitution. To allow the
State to erect a legal system that prevents a large segment of society from
obtaining access to the courts deforms the Madisonian form of government,
that attach to its ownership. Thus, the State holds the ultimate remedy in almost
every property dispute. Similarly, the wrong that gives rise to a right of damages
in tort exists only because society's lawmakers have created a standard of care
and a duty to abide by that standard. The alternatives to resort to the judicial
process in tort cases are negotiation and settlement, abandonment of recovery,
private self-help, and perhaps insurance. With the exception of insurance, the
alternatives are exactly the same as in a divorce case-negotiate a separation
agreement, decide to continue the marriage relationship, or violate the law.
Likewise, contracts are valuable only because society will enforce them. Indeed,
marriage itself when analyzed in purely legal terms is a contract that cannot be
revoked without governmental approval. Thus, the judicial process is the exclusive
means through which almost any dispute can ultimately be resolved short of
brute force.
Id. at 956-57 (footnote omitted).
90. As Frank Michelman points out, the argument about alternative dispute resolution
fairly passeth understanding .... An indigent insolvent person, for example,
has alternative avenues to relief from debts only on the assumption that his
creditors are not unyielding. But why should they yield, since he is indigent and,
by holding out, they cannot get less than they would get out of bankruptcy?
Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's
Rights-Part I, 1973 DuKE L.J. 1153, 1179.
91. See, e.g., J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT: AN ESSAY CONCERNING
rm TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF CInIL GOVERNMENT (3rd ed. 1966).
92. Breger, supra note 82, at 288.
93. See D. LuBAN, supra note 74, at 259.
94. "I cannot believe that my Brethren would find the rights of a man with both legs cut
off by a negligent railroad less 'fundamental' than a person's right to seek a divorce." Meltzer,
402 U.S. at 958.
95. See Bork, supra note 24.
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creating, in effect, an aristocracy where some citizens can enforce their
rights and others cannot. 96
The neutral access principle is therefore firmly established in the Consti-
tution. Not only does the principle logically flow from Bork's neutral
application requirement, but it can also be derived and defined from both
the due process clauses and the overall structure of the Constitution. For a
judge to remain principled, to hold to the original understanding of the
Constitution and not become a "naked power organ," the judge must derive
principles that will protect the right to court access for all citizens, including
the poor.
III. NEUTRAL APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT TO NEUTRAL ACCESS:
THE INDIGENT'S RIGHT TO LEGAL SERVICES
How then shall this right to neutral access be applied to the issue of
indigent access to the courts in today's world? That is, how does the right
96. The famous case of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, reh'g denied, 351 U.S. 958 (1956)
(indigent defendant entitled to a free transcript to prepare his appeal), prompted commentary
that justified the right on the grounds of the indigent's right to participate in society. Wilcox
& Bloustein, The Griffin Case-Poverty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CoRmNE1 L.Q. 1,
16-17 (1957). Deriving the right to access from the governmental processes of the Constitution
answers challenges based on the following argument:
(The poor man is] doubtlessly deprived of many things besides [access to the
courts]; proper medical care, for instance. Would anyone argue that [the state]
owes a constitutional duty to provide medical care to the poor? If not, how can
anyone argue that it owes a constitutional duty to provide a type of access to
the courts?
[The answer is that access to the courts is] not of the same order, in our
theory of government, as basic medical services. The provision of applied justice
is an essential function of the state even under the most conservative political
theory. It is of the essence of citizenship that a person have access to the state's
legal institutions. Without this he is without full citizenship; he is a helpless
victim of the government's monopoly of force....
We cannot conceive of a man as truly a citizen if he is too poor to have access
to the cohrts. We can, however, conceive of him as truly a citizen if he is too
poor to receive adequate medical care.
A state which provides its citizens with medical care we term a welfare state.
It has extended the role of government to provide for the social welfare of its
people. And if we dislike welfare states, we may repeat the adage that "that
government is best which governs least."
But a state which does no more than to provide all its citizens with applied
justice is not extending the role of government to novel fields but rather only
giving all men that which is the most basic function of government, the provision
of legal process.
... Contrary to [some suggestions], there is no contradiction in holding it
unconstitutional to require money from the poor for legal services while holding
it constitutional to require money from them for educational or medical services.
These last are services of a different order. Access to the processes of law is
embedded in our constitution and in every democratic constitution, as a necessary
element in the relationship between the citizen and his government.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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to neutral access that has been derived and "defined in the context of the
world [the framers] knew, apply to the world we know?" 97 To prove a
violation of the right to neutral access an indigent should establish: (1) that
he or she was denied neutral access to the courts and (2) that the denial
was a result of state action.
A. The Necessity of Legal Services for Neutral Access
Neutral access is access to the legal system that provides a judge a
reasonable opportunity to apply the law neutrally in fact. At a minimum,
in an adversarial system, neutral access requires that both parties have the
ability to use the procedural and substantive law necessary to present
evidence and legal doctrine relevant to the case before the court. Neutral
access thus requires that each party possess at least minimal competence to
use the legal system.9
While access to legal counsel and other legal services may have been
unnecessary to achieve minimal competence in the courts at the time the
Constitution was written, there is little question that such access is needed
to utilize today's complex judicial machinery. The simple fact is that today
a right of access to the courts is meaningless without access to the services
of lawyers. Our legal institutions are designed to be operated by lawyers,
not laypersons. 9 Statutes and judicial decisions are written in such a way
that they are fully intelligible only to the legally trained. As one commentator
puts it:
Because of the complexity of litigation in modern courts, laymen are
incapable of effective and thorough advocacy of their claims. Our
judicial system is inundated with technicalities of procedures and nuances
of law which present incomprehensible barriers to laymen who seek
access to the courts. Our courts do not dispense justice with the simplistic
fairness of Solomon; under our system of laws, justice is as often
dependent upon the manipulation of complex procedures and symbols
as it is on the merits of a cause .... As a result, it is not surprising
that the layman who is unaided by the legal specialist is often lost within
our judicial system, for he lacks the skills which are necessary to
effectively advocate his position. Consequently, access to the legal proc-
ess, to courts and to justice itself is dependent upon "the guiding hand
of counsel."'' '
97. R. Bornu, supra note 1, at 168.
98. D. Lubin, supra note 74, at 246.
99. The one exception to this is small claims court. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 33-11.6-4-6
(1988).
100. Brickman, Of Arterial Passageways Through the Legal Process: The Right of Universal
Access to Courts and Lawyering Services, 48 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 595, 617-18 (1973) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)) (holding that defendants had a
right to counsel in capital cases under the due process clause).
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The necessity of access to legal services to obtain neutral access to the
courts is readily apparent when one considers a poor person attempting to
represent himself or herself. Suppose, for example, a poor person actually
had the educational level and the time to read and understand the applicable
legal texts. Suppose further that "[he or] she understood the principle of
stare decisis, had the knack of 'thinking like a lawyer,' developed a taste
for Byzantine reasoning, logic chopping, and casuistry."' 0' Even so, without
a basic grasp of procedural and evidentiary tactics as well as access to
physical resources such as typewriters and photocopy machines, "[t]he
inescapable conclusion is that her supposed access to the legal system, based
on the bare fact that no regulations forbid her from self-representation, is
nothing but a joke."'10
The response to the above argument is that a poor person's inability to
obtain legal services is not the fault of the legal system. Instead it is the
fault of the economic system that allows poverty to exist. One could further
argue that the state cannot be held responsible for failing to make up the
gap.'0 3 This objection, however, is based on the false premise that the state
has not blocked poor people from obtaining access to the legal system. The
state has erected numerous barriers that effectively strip indigents of their
right to neutral access to the courts.
B. State Action Denying Neutral Access
State decisions have resulted in a legal system that laypeople cannot
operate. Over the years, state decisions have brought the American legal
system from a point where it was used and operated by laymen to a system
"inundated with technicalities of procedure and nuances of law which
present incomprehensible barriers to laymen who seek access to the courts."'04
The inability of some citizens to afford lawyers is also the result of
choices made by the state. The state has in large part delegated attorneys'
fees regulation to the state bar associations.'0 State courts, in addition to
101. D. LuBAN, supra note 74, at 245.
102. Id.
103. See Wilcox & Bloustein, supra note 96, at 15-17, for a discussion of the invalidity of
the premise "that the state owes its citizens no more than to make justice available to them
[if they can afford it]." Id.
104. Brickman, supra note 100, at 617-18; see also D. LuBAN, supra note 74, at 246
(discussing the impact of state regulations of attorney fees and unauthorized practice of law
on poor laypeople); Grey, Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 Yns.z L.J.
545, 556 (1967).
105. This regulation, in turn, is enforced by the highest court in each state. D. LuaAN,
supra note 74, at 246. "Bar association-imposed restrictions on access involve state action
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment." Brickman, supra note 100, at 642 n.254
(citing Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoLum. L. Ray. 1083 (1960); Note, Exclusions
from Private Associations, 74 YALE L.J. 1313, 1319-21 (1965)).
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enforcing these regulations (i.e., the Model Code1° and Model Rules'0°),
regulate attorneys' fees directly through actions such as striking down
excessive fees.1°8 Perhaps the most direct state action affecting a poor
person's access to legal services comes from the state court's power to
appoint counsel in certain cases and to deny compensation to appointed
counsel if budgets do not permit compensation." °0
Regulation of the unauthorized practice of law has also worked to price
legal services beyond the reach of much of the public. 10 In thirty-seven
jurisdictions it is a misdemeanor for a nonlawyer to practice law, and in
seven other jurisdictions courts can cite unauthorized practitioners for
contempt."' These restrictions on the practice of law create a professional
monopoly guaranteeing an inflated level of lawyers' fees and limiting access
to the legal system."
2
The state, therefore, has erected numerous barriers to court access in
violation of a poor citizen's right to neutral access to the courts."3 This
106. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILI (1980).
107. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
108. "[C[ourts are often willing to strike down attorneys' fees if they are too high, as in
treble-damage private antitrust class actions." D. LUBAN, supra note 74, at 246.
109. See id.
110. See Brickman, supra note 100, at 642; D. LuBAN, supra note 74, at 246.
111. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis
of Unauthorized Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. Rnv. 1, 11 (1981) [hereinafter Rhode, Policing the
Professional Monopoly]; D. LuBAN, supra note 74, at 246. See generally Rhode, The Delivery
of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, 4 GEo. J. LEGAL ETmcs 209 (1990) [hereinafer Rhode,
Non-Lawyer Practice].
112. D. LtmBAN, supra note 74, at 246-47. "The controls exercised by the bar acting on
behalf of the state, or directly by the state, over who may engage in the practice of law, in
turn enable lawyers to maintain high fee schedules .... Simply stated, it is the unauthorized-
practice regulations that have the principal impact on the price of legal services, and it is price
that controls access." Brickman, supra note 100, at 662 (footnote omitted); see also F. MAmxs,
THE LEGAL NEEDS OF ran POOR: A CluncAL ANALYisS 2 (1971). Clark Durant, former head
of the Legal Services Corporation, held the view that "[the greatest barrier to widely dispersed,
low cost dispute resolution for the poor, and for all people, could well be the laws protecting
our profession [from competition]." Rhode, Non-Lawyer Practice, supra note 111, at 218-19
(quoting Durant's 1987 speech to the ABA Board of Governors).
The official rationale for unauthorized practice regulations is to protect consumers. Rhode,
Non-Lawyer Practice, supra note IlI, at 209; see also D. LtuBAN, supra note 74, at 247. A
study conducted in 1979, however, indicated that unauthorized practice regulations elevate
legal fees without serving any other significant public interest. See Rhode, Policing the
Professional Monopoly, supra note 111, at 97-99.
113. This selective exclusion of the poor from the legal system not only falls to confer an
advantage on them-it actively injures them as well. As Professor Luban explains, the legal
system does more than protect people from each other:
[A] legal system ... enormously expands our field of action, allowing us to do
things that we couldn't have done otherwise-to draft wills, adopt children, make
contracts, limit liability. As people utilize these features of the system, a network
of practices-of power and privilege-is set up from which those who have no
access to the system are excluded; and this exclusion itself intensifies the pariah
status of the poor. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the state has conferred
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violation has created an improper balance between the spheres of majority
rule and individual liberty. The Court, as guardian of the Constitution and
the individual rights it guarantees, must correct that imbalance. The only
realistic rule that can do so under our current judicial system is to recognize
an indigent's right to legal services.
CONCLUSION
As Bork emphasizes, "Judges must never hesitate to apply old values to
new circumstances, whether those circumstances spring from changes in
technology or changes in the impact of traditional common law actions. ' 1 4
Considering the changes in our judicial system over the last two hundred
years, the recognition of an indigent's right to legal services is a legitimate
and logical evolution of the neutral access principle.
The judge's duty in the context of an indigent's access to the courts is
to ensure that the neutral access principle established by the framers is
"made effective in today's altered world.'"' 5 Given today's judicial system,
application of that principle should require the recognition of an indigent's
right to legal services. Only then can the Court hope to retain its legitimacy
before the more vulnerable citizens of our country. Only then can the Court
protect the powers and freedoms the framers sought to guarantee to all
citizens regardless of their economic status in society.
the advantages of the legal system on those who can afford to use it and built
it on the backs of those who cannot.
D. LuBAN, supra note 74, at 247.
114. R. BoRK, supra note 1, at 169 (quoting Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 993 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., concurring)).
115. Id.
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